

growth in various domains. He begins by describing how the pursuit of growth became a dominant focus for American economists in the middle of the twentieth century, anchored by national income accounting techniques that were developed during the interwar period. Yarrow then highlights the centrality of growth to postwar American political debates and the salient role of economists, most notably through the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA, established as part of the Employment Act of 1946). Much of this narrative covers familiar territory, but Yarrow is keen to emphasize the public face of policy history: how postwar American presidents increasingly used economic statistics to define the success of their administrations and how CEA economists became minor political celebrities, pushing the mantra of growth in congressional testimony, press releases, articles, and speeches.

These changes in political discourse were aided and reflected in other arenas. Yarrow describes the promotion of a “people’s capitalism” by various business groups—ranging from the conservative National Association of Manufacturers to the center-left Committee for Economic Development—which, despite their differences, placed rising productivity and economic growth at the center of American identity as a liberal capitalist nation. In this vision, American economic expansion demonstrated the superiority of capitalism and its benefits to American workers, who would share in rising living standards and new technologies. (Surprisingly, though, Yarrow gives little attention to how labor unions championed a similar narrative.) Likewise, growth became, in Yarrow’s terms, the “big postwar story” for American journalism through the early 1960s, as newspapers and magazines revamped their content to make economic and business reporting a prominent feature, complete with lavish charts, graphs, and tables and heroic stories about leading economists. Finally, Yarrow examines the changing depictions of the United States both in American international propaganda and in history textbooks and educational films. This discussion forms Yarrow’s most original and striking example, as he shows how educational materials shifted from emphasizing political values to placing free enterprise and industrial productivity at the heart of the American experience.

In Yarrow’s view the mid-1960s marked an inflection point in the cultural history of growth as critical voices from both the Right and Left gained new traction in challenging the dominant postwar narratives. The fragile coalition that had supported a loosely Keynesian, growth-centered liberalism fragmented as skeptics on the left dissected the flaws of the postwar consumer society and conservatives attacked government intervention. Meanwhile, persistent poverty and the economic crises of the 1970s undermined public confidence in America’s economic might and thwarted expectations that growth would prove a panacea for social and economic ills.

Though Yarrow is largely successful at intertwining policy history with the history of public culture, the

book is not without its limitations. Despite Yarrow’s title and the significance of economic statistics for his overall thesis, he gives little attention to the creation and calculation of these numbers. In fact, arguments about the proper conceptual basis for national income accounting date back to the very origin of these statistics in the wake of World War II and encompass many of the same issues that would resurface in later critiques. Statistics, far from being simple compilations of unquestionable economic or social facts, are equally a form of cultural discourse, and Yarrow’s valuable addition to the history of the postwar United States would be strengthened by historicizing the measurement of “economic growth” itself.

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NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES. *Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2011. Pp. xvi, 340. Cloth \$90.00, paper \$28.99.

In November 1978, President Jimmy Carter signed into law the Amateur Sports Act, which included recognition of the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) as an independent non-governmental organization (NGO). A little more than a year later, in response to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, Carter announced that the United States would boycott the Olympic Games scheduled to take place in Moscow in the summer of 1980 if the USSR did not halt its invasion and promptly withdraw. “No one in the administration made any effort to contact . . . USOC officials until after the President had determined his policy” (p. 107). Neither the Carter administration nor the USOC made a serious effort to consult the athletes who had trained for years in anticipation of the games. After deciding on a boycott, Carter sent Vice President Walter Mondale to demand that the USOC vote against sending a team to Moscow. The USOC meekly complied. During the Winter Olympics at Lake Placid, New York, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance astonished and infuriated the International Olympic Committee (IOC) by insisting that the United States was determined to boycott the Olympics as a way “to preserve the meaning of the Olympics for years to come” (p. 124). The National Olympic Committees of Great Britain, France, and Italy defied their governments and sent teams to Moscow, but Chancellor Helmut Schmidt buckled under intense pressure from Carter and pressured Germany’s National Olympic Committee not to send a team. Schmidt prevailed by a narrow vote. Whether the Moscow Games were a success or failure is still debated. Nicholas Evan Sarantakes concludes, a little too positively, “There is no question that the boycott did damage, but the athletic competitions in Moscow themselves were worthy of their Olympic name . . . No one in Moscow . . . really missed the boycotters” (p. 226).

His narrative history of a weak president’s worst moments begins with the chauvinist public response to the

unexpected Winter Olympics triumph of the young and inexperienced American ice hockey team and then moves back in time to sketch an outline of the history of the Olympics through the IOC's decision to award the 1980 Olympics to Moscow rather than to Los Angeles. Sarantakes traces the inglorious career of Lord Killanin, the least capable of the IOC's modern presidents. (Killanin's determination to resist Carter's demand for cancellation of the summer games was motivated in part by his awareness that he had failed to avert a number of boycotts before and during the 1976 Montreal Olympics.) Sarantakes examines U.S.-Soviet relations from the perspective of Washington, where an unpopular president, burdened by the Iranian hostage crisis, faced electoral challenges not only from Ronald Reagan but also from Edward Kennedy. In contrast to those who have studied the 1980 boycott controversy mainly from an American perspective, Sarantakes looks into the affair as seen from Moscow, where Leonid Brezhnev, seriously ill with cerebral atherosclerosis, faced considerable opposition to his policy of détente.

The great value of this study is the almost day-by-day account of the Carter administration as it thrashed about in search of an effective nonmilitary way to deal with the USSR's unexpected Afghan intervention. The efforts of Carter's special envoy, Lloyd Cutler, are detailed with less ironic comment than called for by Cutler's abysmal ignorance about the Olympics. Commenting on Cutler's demand that the IOC cancel the Moscow games, Sarantakes observes, mildly, that "it became obvious to Killanin that the American did not know what he was talking about" (p. 114). Sarantakes is similarly restrained in his account of the "fiasco" (p. 117) that resulted when Carter sent Muhammad Ali to Africa to rally support for the boycott. Ali's uninformed public statements did "significant damage to the credibility of his diplomatic mission" (p. 116). In a chapter entitled "Civil Wars," Sarantakes skillfully describes Carter's abortive efforts to persuade Margaret Thatcher and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to compel from the British and French National Olympic Committees the abject compliance that Carter received from the USOC. He does justice also to Schmidt's dismay at the Carter administration's attitude that NATO allies "should simply do as they were told" (p. 121).

Although the study is focused primarily on the American boycott of the 1980 summer games, there are also rather cursory chapters on the games themselves and on the Soviet bloc's absolutely predictable tit-for-tat boycott of the 1984 summer games in Los Angeles.

The research devoted to the actions and motivations of the Carter administration is excellent. The same cannot be said for the research devoted to foreign sources. On the whole, however, factual errors seem to be few and forgivable. Nineteen photographs with informative captions illustrate the narrative. The English-language bibliography is extensive. There is also a useless epilogue with paragraph-length accounts of the post-1980 careers of the principal actors. Readers interested in

whatever happened to Carter, Ali, et al. should look elsewhere.

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JEFFREY CRAIG SANDERS. *Seattle and the Roots of Urban Sustainability: Inventing Ecotopia*. (History of the Urban Environment.) Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press. 2010. Pp. xiii, 288. \$30.00.

What makes Seattle the "Emerald City"? To some the label merely refers to the abundance of evergreen fir trees in the vicinity, and to others it refers to the environmentally sensitive urban population that ranges from skiing, mountain biking, kayaking yuppies to tree-hugging, unshaven, eco-raiding hippie throwbacks. Jeffrey Craig Sanders clearly explicates and defends the proposition that Seattle residents are indeed environmentally sensitive and argues that the postwar environmental movement originated in such grassroots, local, political, and social initiatives as occurred in Seattle after World War II. How Seattle became green is the topic of his book.

The author describes several instances of urban activism and rising environmental awareness, beginning with a description of the effort to preserve Pike Place Market. The market had started as a viable commercial link between the agricultural hinterland and the urban population in the early twentieth century. By the post-World War II period, the market had declined in popularity and usefulness as agricultural areas fell to suburban development and urban residents shifted their shopping habits from specialty shops and stalls to the increasingly ubiquitous grocery stores and shopping centers. The increasingly dilapidated Pike Place became the target of urban renewal and development efforts, but urban activists seeking to preserve and restore the market's value as a Seattle cultural icon, viable commercial center, and tourist attraction thwarted the efforts to tear it down.

Next, the author explains the development of effective neighborhood activism in the Central District of Seattle through the Great Society's Model Cities program. Whereas the Model Cities program faltered and failed in many localities, in Seattle the program developed into a vibrant political organization that trained many young activists who went on to long careers in the city's political life. Another type of activism developed out of the efforts to control the future use of the de-commissioned Fort Lawton as urban open space. Native American activists clashed with middle-class Audubon Society members in debates over the appropriate uses of open space, which were finally resolved in a compromise that allowed both groups to control portions of the location.

The last two chapters in the book describe counter-culture activism centered on urban agriculture and community gardens, recycling and urban homesteading with the use of green building and remodeling methods, and outreach and education efforts through newslet-